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The banquet of Aeolus:
A familistic interpretation of Italy's lowest low fertility
1
Gianpiero Dalla Zuanna 
2
Abstract
During the last fifteen years in the Western countries, the higher is the proportion of
people aged 20-30 living in the parental home, the lower is fertility. In this paper I
suggest that the familistic structure of family and society can help in understanding both
these demographic behaviours, looking at the Italian case. Nevertheless, these patterns
could hold in the strong-family area as a whole, i.e. the Mediterranean Europe.
The familism refers to some social norms managing the relationships among
members and generations within the nuclear family and kinship. Direct and indirect
connections between familistic norms and marital and reproductive behaviour are
described, using data from several sources for Italy during the new demographic
transition. Finally, I argue that the triumph of the familistic society could be a pyrrhic
victory, because the native Italian population risks being unable to reproduce itself.
                                                          
1  A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 2
nd workshop on Lowest Low Fertility, held at
the Max Planck Institute, Rostock, Germany in December 1999. I wish to thank all the participants for
their suggestions and I also take the opportunity of thanking Maria Castiglioni, Paolo De Sandre,
Massimo Livi Bacci, Letizia Mencarini and the four anonymous referees of Demographic Research for
their useful comments.
2  Department of Statistics, University of Messina, Italy.  Home address: via Delle Palme 35, 35100
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1. Introduction
A number of authors have described how marital and reproductive behaviour in the
Western World has changed over the last 30 years. By way of summarising this tale, the
decline in fertility has been accompanied by the ageing of fertility and marriage
patterns, increasing cohabitation and extramarital births, along with rising union
dissolution and remarriage (or re-cohabitation). In Italy, late fertility and marriage are in
line with Northern and Central European Countries (NCEC), whereas cohabitation,
divorces and extramarital births are relatively few ( see Table 1). Why have some
changes diffused easily, whereas other kinds of “modern” behaviour are rare? And what
is the cause of the “resultant” lowest low fertility rate?
The low level of cohabitation and extramarital births should be underlined, as in
Western Europe, during the 1990s, the more diffused extramarital births are, the higher
the TFR is, with a striking change compared to the past, until the beginning of the 80s
(see Figure 1 and Table 2). Empirical data show that in Italy the low cohabitation rate is
strictly related to the late departure from the parental home, as the transition from
parental home to living alone is rare (Billari et al., 1999b, 2000). Consequently, to
understand Figure 1, the association between the late departure from the parental home
and the lowest low fertility rate should be studied.
The familistic characteristics of Italian society are discussed in this article. I will
illustrate how  familism lubricates the behavioural mechanisms underlying the Italian
lowest low fertility. After a description of the Italian familistic way of life, the influence
of  familism on impeding departure from the parental home and fertility will be
described. This article deals with Italy, the data on other European countries only being
used to better emphasise the Italian situation. A familistic interpretation of marital and
reproductive behaviour might be useful in explaining the peculiarities of other countries,
such as Spain and – with marked differences – Japan, as some comparative research
could show ( Billari  et al., 2000;  Dalla  Zuanna  et al., 1998). Nevertheless, before
extending the hypotheses discussed here to other countries and populations, systematic
comparisons should be developed.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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Table 1:   Twelve indicators of marital and reproductive behaviour in eighteen
Western Europe countries. 1996 (if available) or 1995. The rank of Italy



























































































































































































































































































































































































































B 25,6 95,9 56 21,2 80,6 6,8 16,4 27,1 1,83 1,55 13,6 34,1
DK 29,7 195,2 67 53,2 82,4 7,5 39,5 27,5 1,84 1,75 14,2 37,4
G 26,6 109,1 57 19,2 73,5 9,8 17,7 28,3 1,67 1,32 10,5 34,1
GR 26,0 72,2 52 3,5 78,1 9,6 16,9 26,8 2,03 1,30 4,1 17,2
SP 27,1 95,5 58 9,5 76,1 5,9 23,4 28,5 1,90 1,17 4,2 11,8
F 27,4 158,4 54 45,5 81,6 7,0 25,3 27,9 2,13 1,72 11,7 21,5

























L 26,5 93,3 58 24,3 96,4 7,1 28,4 27,5 1,69 1,76 9,5 24,1
NL 26,7 131,7 56 20,6 93,4 4,1 27,7 28,6 1,87 1,53 11,6 28,8
A 26,3 123,6 55 33,1 71,5 11,7 17,4 25,9 1,77 1,42 11,5 29,4
P 24,9 86,6 73 20,7 76,8 16,0 19,0 25,9 1,97 1,43 6,3 17,7
FIN 27,3 192,6 59 40,8 88,5 6,9 28,5 27,2 1,88 1,76 15,9 21,4
SW 28,9 255,0 44 51,5 74,0 5,5 26,1 26,8 2,03 1,60 16,5 19,5
UK 26,7 107,9 53 49,1 84,6 23,3 25,9 27,4 2,02 1,72 16,0 35,4
ICE 28,8 208,1 55 74,8 76,8 16,4 37,9 25,0 2,47 2,12 13,2 29,6
NO 27,7 153,9 58 61,7 82,2 9,8 28,2 26,5 2,05 1,89 13,7 27,4
CH 27,3 136,6 64 9,3 97,5 4,0 24,3 28,6 1,75 1,50 11,5 29,9
B: Belgium; DK: Denmark; G: Germany; GR: Greece; SP: Spain; F: France; IRE: Ireland; I: Italy; L: Luxembourg; NL: The
Netherlands; A: Austria; P: Portugal; FIN: Finland; SW: Sweden; UK: United Kingdom; ICE: Iceland; NO: Norway; CH:
Switzerland; AUS: Australia; HUN: Hungary.
Source: Cantisani, Dalla Zuanna [1999].Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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Figure 1: Association between TFR, marital fertility and extramarital fertility. 1981
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Figure 1: (Continued)
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Table 2:  Standardised b regression coefficients between total fertility and its three
most proximate components (marital fertility, proportion of married
women, extramarital fertility). 17 countries of Western Europe (*).




1881 1.00 1.06 0.18 0.84
1911 0.85 0.53 0.19 0.99
1921 0.83 0.27 0.23 0.96
1931 0.90 0.38 0.18 0.99
1961 1.53 0.93 0.27 0.99
1971 0.92 0.01 0.25 0.78
1981 1.05 0.17 0.44 0.96
1991 0.58 0.05 0.89 0.94
1996 0.48 0.02 0.89 0.91
 (*) For the period 1881-1971 the source is Coale and Cotts Watkins [1986, pp. 78-152]. As indicators, If, Ig, Im, Ih, calculated for
the Princeton project were used. France was excluded from the elaboration, being defined as an outlier due to its role as
precursor in the fertility decline. Correlation values, particularly for the first two years, would have been largely determined by
France if it had been included in the regression analysis. Two separate values were given for England-Wales and Scotland.
For the final three years (which included France) the following indicators were used: TFR for total fertility, (legitimate births /
married women) 15-44 for legitimate fertility, (unmarried women / women) 15-44 for the number of single women, (extramarital
births / unmarried women)15-44 for extramarital fertility. As there is no large difference in the age structure of the total
population and unmarried and married women in the 18 countries, it was not necessary to construct the Princeton indicators for
the last two years.
Source: Cantisani, Dalla Zuanna [1999].
2. The familistic Italian way of life
In a recent paper Reher (1998) pointed out how the NCEC and Mediterranean countries
are characterised by two different family systems: the weak and the strong family,
respectively. In the weak-family area family ties (between parents and children, and
among siblings) become less and less important during the teens and after the second
decade of life. Consequently, children leave the parental home early, to work as servants
(in the  ancien  régime) or to live alone, with friends or a partner (in recent years).
Moreover, ageing persons are seldom assisted by their children during their last years.
On the contrary, in the strong-family area family ties persist. Children leave the parental
family only at marriage, or sons bring their wives into the parental home. When the neo-
local rule is followed, children usually live near their parents after marriage, parents
help their children during the chilrearing of grandchildren, and parents are assisted by
their children during the last years of their lives.
Reher shows how this social geographical fault – deep-rooted in the Late Roman
Empire and reinforced during the Middle Ages – crosses other important familial andDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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social differences. In the Italian and Iberian regions, the strong-family system has
dominated up until the present day. It is an ingrained anthropological feature, which has
by no means waned, as shown also by Kuijsten (1996), when studying recent social and
demographic behaviour.
Following in the footsteps of Reher, in a recent article Micheli (2000) underlines
that in Italy as a whole the anthropological family structure is largely based on kinship,
even if the rule of residence of the couple (patrilocal vs. neolocal), the diffusion of the
stem-family, and the age at first marriage of both spouses show deep differences among
counties. To use Micheli’s terminology, in Northern Italy the historical form of strong-
family is the “Latin pattern”, based on the stem-family and family-farm (in the past),
proximity of residence among relatives and the family-firm (currently). On the contrary,
in the Southern regions the historical form of  strong-family is the “Mediterranean
pattern”, where the  neolocal families are encapsulated in the family alliance (the
Asabiyyah). In spite of these differences,  Micheli, using empirical data, shows that
kinship ties are more important and diffused than bonds with neighbours and friends, if
all the Italian areas are compared with NCEC. Summing up, Reher’s classification of
European families (strong vs. weak family) is reinforced by  Micheli’s analysis, who
places the variegated Italian context in a European framework.
The connection between family ties (strong vs. weak) and reproductive behaviour
has not been developed by Reher. Nevertheless, as during the last 20 years in the strong-
family area fertility has been the lowest world-wide, the social rules underpinning the
strong-family system may be similar to those underlying the lowest low fertility.
Consequently, a better definition of these could be useful.
In my opinion, much of this task has already been done by various anthropologists,
sociologists, historians and demographers, who have concurred in describing the
familistic way of life ( Banfield, 1958;  Aldmon and  Verba, 1963;  Balbo, 1976;
Ginsborg, 1989, 1994a, 1998; Saraceno, 1994; Dalla Zuanna, 1995).
Following these authors, in a familistic oriented society, most people:
-  Consider their own utility and family utility as being one and the same thing;
-  Believe that every one else does too;
-  Follow these two rules throughout their lives.
These rules especially concern the relationships between parents and
children; having guaranteed his/her nuclear family, each person then extends these
rules to the kinship. In other words, in a familistic oriented society, throughout
their life most people seek their own happiness and at the same time that of their
nuclear family and – if possible – their relatives. This familistic way of life can be
considered as the “spirit” of the strong-family system described by Reher.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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Further to this definition, familism is not a general attitude toward the “traditional
family”, based on marriage and children, with the  bread-winner father and the
housewife, also found in demographic literature ( Lesthaeghe and  Meekers, 1986;
Krishnan, 1990). As described in section five, familism and the traditional family are
linked, but familism can persist even where traditional family-life declines.
This emphasis on  familism in interpreting Italian society has not been readily
accepted universally. Some authors radically criticise familism as being an explanation
for certain characteristic features of Italian society (De Masi, 1976; Gribaudi, 1994).
Familism is not considered as a cause, but rather as being the effect of poverty and
underdevelopment (in the past) and of the incapacity of the State to guarantee impartial
welfare and rights to its citizens (today). Moreover, it is stated that it is not possible to
speak of “Italian families” without considering the differences between North and
South, town and country, and social class ( Gribaudi, 1994). In answer to these
criticisms, it is difficult to fully subscribe to the viewpoint of those authors who
overemphasise the importance of  familism in Italian history and society (e.g. Altan,
1986). Nevertheless, abundant empirical evidence shows that currently in Italian society
– not only in its backward and archaic strata  – the  familistic viewpoint should be
considered to better explain many kinds of social behaviour. Furthermore,  Reher’s
considerations on the historical roots and the persistence throughout the centuries of the
strong-family system in Mediterranean Europe suggest that parents transmit the
familistic way of life to their children, an “explanatory variable” rather than the
consequence of other social processes.
The authors mentioned above have studied the influence of familism on several
sectors of Italian life, implicitly assuming that the intimate structure of family ties
orients various social organisations: political parties, trade unions, businesses,
universities, criminal groups and so on.  Many authors underline the strength of the
family as an institution contrasting with others – church, government, the community,
etc. (e.g. Ginsborg, 1989, 1998). Moreover, in my opinion it is difficult to develop this
macro-social perspective without considering the micro-level of  familism, which is
rooted in the psychological and anthropological rules described above.
This paper will examine the connection between  familism and reproductive
behaviour and some general data connected with Italian familism will be illustrated,
comparing Italy with other Western countries. These general topics will be of relevance
below, when the late departure from the parental home and lowest low fertility are
considered.
Trust in others outside the kin is considerably lower in Italy than in any other
Western country (Table 3). This is a possible indicator of the Italian familistic way of
life, with trust in the kinship being very high (see Table 9 below). This dramatic
difference is an important key in understanding the low esteem with which civic valuesDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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are held in Italy. As the aforementioned authors found, familism and civic values cannot
easily walk hand in hand.
Table 3: Percentage of people declaring that the most of their compatriots are
“very” or “somewhat” trustworthy. Year 1986.
Italy GR P SP F IRL B UK NL G LUX DK
33 49 62 68 69 72 76 79 80 84 85 88
Source: Eurobarometro, Bollettino Doxa, XL, 22-23, Nov. 17
th [1986]. Data quoted by Inglehart [1990]. For the abbreviations of the
countries, see the note of table 1.
Another important consequence of Italian familism – and the low esteem of civic values
– is the gap between private wealth and the quality of public services (Saraceno, 1994).
In Italy, public services are – generally speaking – at a low level, if per capita income is
considered. Perhaps the most striking example is the housing policy, where tenure has
been positively encouraged, nor can public housing policy be compared to the majority
of the NCEC. Thus the anxiety of the part of Italians to become house owners, as can be
seen in Table 4 for the period 1961-91, which has continued throughout the 90s, with no
sign of a let-up. This hampers any decision on the part of young people to leave the
parental home, cohabit and marry. Moreover, given these trends on the housing market
it is not easy to change residence and to do so a thorough knowledge of the local area is
needed to find a dwelling. Thus, many prospective house owners are actively
encouraged to live near their family, although this is often more a question of choice, in
keeping with the prevailing familism, rather than necessity (Table 5).
Table 4:  Percentage of households owner of their houses.
Italy Other Europeans countries (1990-91)
1961 1971 1981 1991 GR SP F B UK NL G DK
46 51 59 68 76 78 54 54 67 45 39 54
Source: For Italy: census data; for other countries: census data collated by Eurostat. For the abbreviations of the countries, see the
note of table 1.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
142 http://www.demographic-research.org
Table 5:  Residence of parents and children in some industrialised countries
during the 1980s.
UK USA AUS G A HUN Italy
Proportion % of parents living with at least …
… an adult son 32 21 30 40 39 37 60
… an adult daughter 29 14 25 26 25 30 58
Proportion % of adult children not living with parents whose mother lives at a distance of…
… 15 minutes of less 32 27 24 38 37 43 57
… between 15 minutes and 1
hour
40 31 33 30 35 35 26
… between 1 and 5 hours 19 19 20 22 23 19 8
… 5 hours or more 9 23 23 9 4 4 4
Proportion % of adult people
living near their mother (1 hour of
distance or less) who see her
every day
11 16 7 20 17 32 32
Source: Jowell et al. (eds.) [1989], quoted by Ginsborg [1994a]. For the abbreviations of the countries, see the note of table 1.
This could lead to the belief that welfare expenditure is low, which is simply not the
case. The problem is that most welfare expenditure is directly transferred from the State
to families, rather than to the public services. Moreover, most of these transfers go to
the aged, financing pensions, whereas young people and couples with children are
overlooked. This topic, which is very important in discouraging fertility, will be
reconsidered below.
The Italian economy is also deeply steeped in familism. The production sector is
characterised by thousands of small firms, whose founders are usually siblings or other
relatives (see Table 6). Many years after the company's founding, owners and managers
often continue to belong to the same family as the founder(s) (children, their spouses,
nieces, nephews, grandchildren). This kind of organisation is not only typical of small
firms: the Agnelli dynasty and the four Benetton brothers are but two examples of the
success of this kind of model on broad industrial dimensions.
Moreover, the Italian industrial system is strongly oriented towards the production
of consumer goods that emphasise the quality of life, particularly inside the home (see
Table 7). This last topic will be reconsidered below when considering the impact of
increased relative economic deprivation from a familistic perspective on fertility declineDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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Table 6.  Some data on dimension of firms.  Some EU countries around 1995.
Italy SP F UK NL G SW
% industrial income produced by firms with
fewer then 50 workers (1)
51 42 39 28 41 31 33
% industrial workers employed in firms with
fewer then 50 workers (2)
64 63 50 43 42 41 43
Source: Eurostat Yearbook, 1997 (Italian version) p. 366. For the abbreviations of the countries, see the note of table 1.
Table 7:  The “house quality ” industrial sectors where the Italian trade balance
was the best in the world. Year 1996
Products Italy's commercial trade
positive balance
(in millions of $)
Italy's principal competitors
(commercial trade balance – millions
of $)
Ornamental stone 1,702 China (100)
Ceramic tiles 3,327 Spain (1,427)
Chairs and sofas 3,126 China (421)




Taps and valves 2,378 Germany (1,815)
Marble cutting machinery 682 Japan (297)
Locks and ironmongery 1,054 Taiwan (526)
Stove and hobs 506 China (107)
Radiators and boilers 614 Germany (291)
Fridges and freezers 2,431 The USA (1,465)
Washing machines 1,701 Germany (327)
Source: Fortis [1998].
Finally, both sides of the coin are evident when considering the labour market. Thanks
to family assistance, Italian society can bear high youth unemployment rates (more than
50% in some Southern provinces), in the absence of public unemployment benefit and
social upheaval. But the influence of the family on the labour market is even greater.
More than 30% of young workers – interviewed in 1996 – found their first job thanks to
the direct intervention of a relative, 50% under their own steam – although some
contribution from the family is to be suspected – whereas less than 20% utilised other
resources (advertisements, public agencies, etc.) – Buzzi et al., 1997, p. 372. While the
role on the part of the family ensures greater flexibility for those entering the labour
market, on the other hand many young people are not actively encouraged to seek
employment. It is often preferred for the young to stay at home, unemployed, rather thanDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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accept a low status occupation. As will be seen parents find it hard to accept a “low
status” child. Consequently, in many parts of unemployed Southern Italy, immigration
from developing countries is high and continually growing.
3. Familism as an obstacle to leaving the parental home
Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna (1994), in a previous analysis of the 1991 national survey,
described the parental family as the golden cage of Italian youth. Later surveys in 1995
(Buzzi et al., 1997) and 1998 (IRP, 1999), the latter with a more demographic focus,
showed that there was a trend in favour of greater autonomy but that this continued to be
based within the family home (Table 8).  Familistic parents do not encourage their
children to leave, and young people react by placing their trust and affection in their
parents and relatives (Table 9).
Table 8:  Data on Italian people aged 15-24, interviewed in the 4 rounds of IARD
survey.
1983 1987 1992 1995
Percentage of people living outside the parental family 6 6 5 4
Percentage of  young workers living at parental home who
give all their earnings to the parental family
23 15 9 5
Source: Buzzi et al. [1997].
Table 9:  Mean score assigned to cohabiting relatives by Italian people aged 20-34
in 1998. Scale 1-10.
Father Mother Brothers Sisters Grandparents Other relatives
7.84 8.55 7.99 8.17 8.26 8.13
Source: IRP [1999].
Reher suggests that this situation is rooted in the past, i.e. in inter-generation cultural
transmission. Perhaps, it would be useful to explain this situation from the behavioural
viewpoint, using the  familistic paradigm. Let us first consider the direct effects of
familism on the late leaving the parental home. Usually, children living outside the
family pay for their freedom with a loss of amenities (Hill and Hill, 1976). But Italian
parents are reluctant to see their children suffer in material terms, in the belief that their
offspring’s discomfort is a source of their own malaise. Therefore, parents discourageDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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an early departure from the family home and anyone who does so has to be strongly
motivated (e.g. burdened by strict rules and limited freedom). Nonetheless, the golden
cage is usually very comfortable and almost invisible.
Also directly connected with the late departure from the parental home is the
parents’ major emotional investment in their children. In the aforementioned IRP
survey, both adult children and parents stated that the main disadvantage in leaving the
home was the emotional price paid, and as many as 60% of the parents interviewed said
that the child's departure offered no advantage of any kind.
This co-operative adult family (I thank  Rossella  Palomba for this felicitous
terminology) is based on a double exchange: both parties (parents and adult children)
give and receive material and emotional goods: parents give more material goods and
receive more affection, adult children give more affection and receive more material
goods. For some authors, this material exchange, at the end of the life course, will be
more balanced in favour of parents, if the pension system is considered (Cigno and
Rosati, 1992). Nevertheless, it is less risky, for adult children, to stay on in the parental
home, than to risk building a new family, where affective and material goods are re-
contracted, on a daily basis, with their partners.
Some might say that this co-operative family of parents and adult children is the
modern version of the court of Aeolus – described by Homer at the beginning of the 10
th
Book of the Odyssey – where the God of the winds gives his six daughters as wives to
his six sons, and offers the six couples an eternal banquet (it is an extreme example of
endogamy, and a good preventive measure against the Oedipus murder!). In Italy, few
young people are as bold as Ulysses, leaving the banquet provided by Aeolus to face the
open seas.
A familistic oriented society also discourages early departure from the parental
family for a number of indirect motives, too. As suggested above,  familism has
contributed to the shortage of rental housing accessible to young people. Moreover,
familism was an important brick in building the Italian welfare system, largely based on
the transfer to old people rather than receipts from the public sector and the payment of
unemployment benefit for all. Nevertheless, any material obstacle to leaving the parental
home should not be over emphasised, as even the young employed with a good income
or home owners usually prefer to remain until marriage (to the joy of their parents!).
Before concluding this section, it could be useful to reconsider the Italian situation
using the household formation framework proposed by  Burch and Matthews (1987).
Following these authors, the answer to the question “With whom shall I live?” stems
from the necessity to procure household goods, which are both material (e.g. domestic
services) and immaterial (e.g. companionship and privacy). The value (the cost) of these
goods is not fixed, but varies with the evolution of the society, and – for the decision
maker – can be considered as exogenous. The researcher could find an answer to theDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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above question defining and measuring this utility function. Looking at “the modern
Western society”, Burch and Matthews define some explanatory hypotheses (i.e. the
utility function), in order to explain the growing proportion of people living alone (or in
a small household). Trying to fit  Burch and Matthews’ hypotheses to the living
arrangements of Italian young people, we discover that they do not refer to “the modern
Western society”, but “the modern weak-family Western society”. The more striking
example concerns the effect of the rising real income. For our authors: “We are on safe
grounds in assuming that one reason so many people now live alone or in very small
households is that they can afford to. They are able to forgo the economies of scale
represented by larger households…”(p. 503). This could describe some aspects of the
Italian situation, but is not useful in understanding why adult children stay in the
parental home until their thirties. In Italy, the increasing income of familistic parents
increases the amount of money available to their adult children. Empirical data show
that during the last 20 years, the proportion of young people in employment living in the
parental home, with their salary at their complete disposal, has substantially increased
(return to table 8). At the same time, for those contributing to the household
expenditures, the proportion of salary given to their parents has substantially dropped
(Buzzi  et al., 1997). This situation – that is strictly related to the  familistic rules
described above – increases the opportunity-cost of leaving the parental home. Hence,
in a familistic oriented society, the rising of real income hampers – rather than favours –
the early departure of children.
Another behavioural hypothesis described by Burch and Matthews concerns the
rising demand for privacy: “With higher real income and a sense of security provided by
an extensive welfare net, the individual turns inward and becomes more concerned with
self-development and personal growth and experience. Recipes for such growth often
emphasise the need for solitude and privacy" (p. 505). In Italy, the growing demand for
privacy coming from adult children is often resolved in the parental home. Data show
that during the last 20 years a growing proportion of adult children (both males and
females) have a room of their own in the parental home (77% for people aged 25-34 in
1998), where they are often free to pursue a sexual relationship with their partner (57%
for people aged 20-34 in 1998) – Buzzi et al., 1997; IRP, 1999.
Summing up,  Burch and Matthews’ framework is very stimulating and the
explanatory hypotheses could hold also for Italy, referring to the living arrangements of
older people and other demographic behaviour reducing the dimension of the
household. But – in my opinion – the explanatory hypotheses should be re-arranged to
understand the long permanence of adult children in the parental home. The familistic
bonds between parents and adult children should be taken into account, as they define
the milieu where the decisions concerning living arrangements are taken.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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4. From the late departure of the parental home to low fertility
Many authors have described the psychological and practical consequences of
remaining in the parental home on several aspects of Italian social life and private
behaviour – see chapter 3 of Ginsborg (1998) for a review. The direct and indirect
consequences of the late departure from the parental home on fertility are stressed in the
following section, which could help cast light on Figure 1.
The direct effect is not as important as it might seem. In Italy, as elsewhere, age at
leaving the parental home is negatively associated with the quantum of fertility (Billari
et al., 1999a, 1999b). Nevertheless (Table 1), in 1996 in Italy the mean age of women
having their first child is not particularly high: 27.8 years, as in the UK and France,
where early departure from the parental home and cohabitation are widely diffused. In
other words – looking at large populations – it is possible to have a late age at first child
and a TFR not far from the replacement level, even if – looking at individual behaviour
– the later the age at first child, the lower the probability of having other children.
Consequently, today, within a European perspective, the problem of Italian fertility
is not its late beginning, but the low probability of having a third, second and – for the
youngest cohorts – a first child.
The main direct effect on fertility is that the late departure from the parental home
often results in the failure to marry and have children. The number of childless women
has strikingly increased among cohorts born after 1955, particularly in Northern Italy.
Table 10 is probably based on too low estimations of late fertility, and the proportion of
those born after 1960 having at least one child will probably be higher. Nevertheless,
childless Italian women born in the mid 1960s will surely top 20%: the proportion of
childless women among cohorts born just ten years previously is going to be doubled. In
this case, a delay of marriage often becomes permanent celibacy (De Sandre et al.,
1997). This is an indication of something amiss,  i.e.  an unsatisfied desire, since
throughout the 1980s and 1990s in all the surveys conducted very few young people
expressed the wish not to marry or have children (see also Table 11).
Table 10:  Percentage of Italian women without birth at the end of reproductive life
by cohort*
1950 1955 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Italy 11 11 15 16 17 18 19 21 23
- North 10 13 18 19 21 22 24 25 27
- Centre 7 10 14 15 17 18 20 22 23
- South 15 13 12 13 14 14 15 17 18
* Data until 1995 are calculated, after 1995 are estimated.
Source: ISTAT [1998], diskette enclosed.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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Let us consider the indirect effects on fertility of a late departure from the parental
home. First of all, men have no experience of housework, since they go directly from
their mother’s arms to their wives, never having lived alone or with friends. Thus Italian
husbands do not help out in the home, even if their wives are in full-time employment
(Bimbi, La Mendola, 1999). The excessive burden for women can be considered as an
important cause of Italy's lowest low fertility.
Another important indirect effect is less easily described and empirically
supported. Staying at home until  their thirties, young Italian people risk
overemphasising each transition in psychological terms. Thanks to the cover offered by
the parental family, they accept a job only if it is in line with their desires, and postpone
marriage until the risk of losing amenities is low. In other words, during the age interval
20-30, when the enthusiasm for innovation should be higher, they fail to develop a taste
for responsibility, almost indispensable to the transition to adulthood. Massimo Livi
Bacci (1997) refers to this Italian situation as being la sindrome del ritardo – “the delay
syndrome”. Young Italian people often become precociously fervent supporters of
Malthus. Garelli (1984) said that this insecurity among young people in facing transition
is the product of the general level of insecurity present in society.  Micheli (1996)
proposed that the inability of today's children in making choices is the direct product of
their parents' insecurity. Golini (1997) supposed that the modernisation of Italy was too
rapid to permit the growth of balanced relations between generations. All these
hypotheses are interesting in putting together the pieces of the puzzle underlying the
motivations for the late departure from the parental home and Italy's lowest low fertility,
but they are not enough to explain the broad differences between Italy and the NCEC.
To better understand the intricacies of the Italian context, the familistic paradigm should
be taken into account.
A brief summary could be useful. Using data from several sources, the connection
in Italy between  familism, late leaving the parental home and  fertility, has been
described for the last 20 years.
Familism encourages late departure from the parental family…
…directly, because:
(a) In the Italian  familistic society, economic conditions at home are more
favourable than living alone, with friends or a partner;
(b) Generally speaking, in Italy the affective bonds between parents and children,
children and other members of the kin are very strong.
… indirectly, because:
(a)  Familism has contributed to the shortage of housing for rent accessible to
young people;Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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(b) Familism was an important brick in building the Italian welfare system, based
on private transfers to older people rather than the availability of
unemployment benefit for all.
Late departure from the parental home negatively influences fertility…
… directly, because:
(a) The higher the age at marriage or cohabitation, the shorter the time-interval
available for childbearing;
(b) Often the delayed departure implies a definitive no to cohabitation, marriage
and childbearing.
… indirectly, because:
(a) Young men do not learn to do housework, and thus in the Italian couple the
working married (or cohabiting) woman has a double role (in the market and
ménage);
(b) Staying on in the parental home until their thirties, young people forget how to
risk, useful to tackle the prospect of childbearing (the “delay syndrome”).
Up to now, the interaction between familism, late departure from the parental home
and low fertility has been described. The puzzle has to be completed by discussing the
effect of familism on the reproductive behaviour of Italian couples.
5. Familism as the lubricating factor in the couples' lowest low
fertility
To explain the falling fertility rate in Western countries from 1970-2000, Lesthaeghe
(1998, 1999) emphasised three compatible theories: (1) increased female autonomy and
opportunity-costs, (2) the increase in relative economic deprivation, (3) changed cultural
attitudes toward post-materialistic values. Let us examine if and how these
interpretations can hold water in the familistic Italian society.
Following the first theory, rising educational levels for women have led to
increased opportunity costs for them and, therefore, to a higher proportion of working
women, to lower fertility and delayed marriage and parenthood (Becker, 1981). Several
authors try to fit this theory in with Italian data, and an apparent statistical “paradox”
has been found, when comparing individual and ecological statistical analyses. Fertility
among more educated Italian women and those in employment is later and slightly lower
than fertility among housewives (see  e.g.  Rosina, 1999; Di  Giulio  et al., 2000).
Nevertheless, when Western countries are considered as statistical units, a strong
positive association is detected between TFR and the proportion of women in the labour
market (Pinnelli, 1992), Italy being characterised by both low fertility and low femaleDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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employment. Similar results are obtained using multilevel models – pooling the FFS
data of several countries – the first level units being women or couples, the second level
units being the countries (De Rose,  Racioppi, 1999). To understand this “unusual”
result, let us consider the fact that an Italian woman, who does not stop working after
having children, must face at least four more “familistic” problems than NCEC mothers.
First of all – as described above – the Italian mother finds society organised as
though the male-breadwinner family were dominant, since public child rearing services
and nursery facilities are scarce. Secondly, she and her partner receive no State support
to face the expenses incurred by a new child, since the family allowance paid to families
with children is extremely low (Ditch et al., 1996). Let us only consider the fact that in
1994, 8 billion U.S. dollars were gathered as taxes to finance family allowances; only
2.5 billion were effectively re-distributed to families with children, whereas 5.5 billion
were used to pay pensions (Saraceno, 1998, p. 104). Moreover – as described above –
the woman is rarely helped by her partner in the ménage: the time spent working (at
home and outside) is dramatically higher for a working Italian married woman than for
an Italian married housewife (Bimbi, La Mendola, 1999). Last but not least, the Italian
mother must face the anxiety of having very little time to spend with her child: she
violates the well entrenched social norm – strictly connected with the familistic rules –
that nothing is better for a child than to be with its mother. Consequently, two main
familistic influences may be detected in Becker's behavioural chain theory.
Following a new-home economics’ viewpoint, the Italian familistic organisation of
couple and society:
(1) Reduces the number of children to couples where both partners are earners,
stressing the economic and psychological contrast between the woman’s
employment and childbearing;
(2) Induces Italian mothers into stopping work whilst the children are growing up,
which is why Italy is characterised by low female participation in the labour
market, that also applies to the Northern regions where unemployment is
practically unknown (Bettio, Villa, 1998). Moreover, half the Italian married
FFS women aged 20-49 in 1996 were housewives at the time of the interview
(Bernardi, 1999).
Social process (1) strengthens the negative association between female employment
and fertility in Italian society. Thanks to social process (2),  familism obstructs
female employment: consequently, familism helps reduce both the Italian TFR and
the proportion of Italian women inside the labour market.
Following the theory of increased relative economic deprivation, rising
consumption expectations lead to the increasing value of private consumption. ThisDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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process leads to competition between children and consumption, since high and rising
consumption expectations can far better be satisfied by dual earner families (Easterlin,
1976). Italian FFS data seem to be consistent with these theoretical expectations (Di
Giulio et al., 2000).
This result can be associated with the following familistic social processes:
(1) As already described in the second section and in Table 7, Italians are strongly
oriented toward consumer goods connected with the quality of life in the home.
These consumer expectations delay age at marriage, and emphasise the cost of
a second or third child; the parents must take into account new high quality
furniture and a new high quality house;
(2) When consumption aspirations rise, child value also increases, because
familistic parents must compete with other familistic parents: adopting, at the
same time,  familistic and consumption oriented viewpoints, a child can be
considered as being a luxury (De  Santis, 1997). Puzzling over these
considerations, material and immaterial investments made by familistic Italian
parents in (what they consider to be) the quality of their children are rather
high.
Three kinds of empirical data support these last statements. In Italy the cost of
children is higher than in the NCEC, and this cost has been growing over the last few
years (Ekart-Jaffé, 1994; De Santis, Righi, 1997). Moreover, ceteris paribus, children
with fewer brothers and sisters have more possibilities of improving their own social
class, thanks to better education (Casacchia, Dalla Zuanna, 1999), see figure 2. These
results show that the strategy of reducing fertility has been a good familistic tool in Italy
over the last 30 years, helping the social climb of few children or the only child.
The third empirical proof can be found in the survey data on the value of children.
Table 11 illustrates the results of a survey conducted on two comparable samples,
interviewed with the same questionnaire in Italy and in the Netherlands in 1989. The
values assigned to children were clearly higher in Italy; from a familistic viewpoint, the
interpretation of these results by Rossella Palomba are easily shared:
The parent-child relationship has been reworked and adjustments have been
made in modern times (…). Today the relationship offers different possibilities:
an insurance against loneliness, finding a purpose in life, and acquiring a social
identity. Italians are not in conflict with traditional values; they are merely
adapting them to fit in with today’s society and with changing times. In this way,
there is not conflict between modernity and tradition as regards values and
children, and Italians place a very high value on children. This high value could,Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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paradoxically, explain the low Italian birth-rate, since Italians invest a great deal
of time, money, attention, and interest in their children and thus, instead of
having several children, they prefer to have only the one child, who becomes the
sole object of much care and attention (Palomba, 1995, page 186).
The last sentence of Palomba is precisely the microeconomists’ notion of substitution of
quality for quantity, strongly emphasised in the Italian familistic context.
Figure 2: Fertility, education and social class. LISREL7 model with ordinal
variables stratified by residence. Women aged 40-49 with at least one job
during the life, interviewed at the beginning of 1996 during the Italian
FFS.
    - 0.219 ^
Fertility of parents Education of father
0.153 - 0.213 0.555
Fertility of daughter Education of daughter
- 0.185 North
    - 0.320 South  0.716
First status* of daughter
   North 0.360
           South 0.488 0.330
Final status* of daughter
CHI
 2 
18 = 7.02 p = 0.990 n = 1,040
^ All the coefficients are statistically significant (a<0.05).
* The first status is measured by a social score of the first job of the woman. The final status is measured by the higher social score
between the job of woman or her partner.
Source: Casacchia, Dalla Zuanna [1999].Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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Table 11:  The values of having children in Italy and the Netherlands. Age group
20-44. Percentage who agrees with the statement.
Italy Netherlands
You cannot be really happy if you do not have children 57 7
Having children is your duty towards society 43 8
The closest relation you can have with anyone is with your own
child
87 38
You can be perfectly satisfied with life if you have been a good
mother or father
79 51
In our modern world the only place where you can feel
completely happy is at home with your children
50 32
Source: Moors [1990].
The third theory has been formulated and re-adjusted by Lesthaeghe, van de Kaa and
others (Lesthaeghe, Meekers, 1986; van de Kaa, 1988; Lesthaeghe, 1995). The basic
idea is that new Western fertility and marital patterns cannot be interpreted without
starting from changes in mentality. As data for Western countries  show, cohort by
cohort the orientation toward post-materialism increases, and this new pattern of values
encourages cohabitation, low fertility and couple dissolution.
In Italy post-materialism is at a lower level than NCEC, even if new cohorts are
fast making up for lost time (Lesthaeghe, Meekers, 1986; Inglehart, 1997; Ginsborg,
1998, pages 244-245). Moreover, the traditional indicator of secularisation (the weekly
participation at mass), after a rapid decrease during the period 1950-81, remained
substantially stable around 30-35% until the mid-1990s ( Pisati, 2000). Generally
speaking, religion has been gaining popularity over the last twenty years, particularly
amongst the young (Table 12), even if many authors and data suggest that Italians have
reverted towards an intimate and self-tailored Catholicism, which is less oriented by
Church teaching (Cesareo et al., 1995).
Table 12: Answer to the question: “Is the religion important in your life?” Four
rounds of the IARD survey. Italian people aged 15-24 *
1983 1987 1992 1996
Very much 7 9 10 12
Much 20 22 22 23
Enough 37 38 37 33
Few 24 23 19 22
No 11 8 10 8
I don’t know 1 0 2 2
* Column percentage.
Source: Buzzi et al. [1997], p. 424.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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Dealing with the empirical connection between fertility and post-materialism and
secularisation indicators (the indicators of these two factors being strictly related –
Clerici, 1999), the statistical “paradox” described above is found again. Among the
more secularised and post-materialist Italian women and counties, fertility is later and
lower (Clerici, 1999; De Sandre, Dalla Zuanna, 1999; Di Giulio et al., 2000; Dalla
Zuanna, Righi, 1999). Nevertheless, assuming a European viewpoint (where countries
are considered as statistical units, adopting both ecological and multilevel analyses),
fertility is lower in the less secularised countries – De Rose, Racioppi, 1999.
The social processes underlying this “paradox” could be similar to the ones already
seen whilst discussing Becker’s theory. The change of values toward individualism and
secularisation could be obstructed by the underlying familistic mentality: consequently,
in Italy both fertility and secularisation are low because they are both dropped by the
Italian familistic way of life. The above sentences can be discussed in light of research
conducted by some authors and their data.
Firstly, familism cannot cohabit with an excessive individualism, because it is a
sort of familiar individualism and during the 1980s and 1990s, after the decline of the
collective dreams of the 1960s, familistic values have celebrated their Italic triumph
(Ginsborg, 1993, pp. 557-566; 1998, p. 533).
On the other hand, familism does not contrast with some Catholic values: e.g. the
idea that families should be defended – rather than substituted – by the State, the
emphasis on the responsibility of parents towards their children. These Catholic values
are largely shared by Italians, while other non-familistic Catholic values are less and
less popular, even amongst those closest to the Catholic Church ( Clerici, 1999;
Ginsborg, 1998, 233-237). An interesting example is the result of the two referendums
on divorce and abortion, carried out in Italy – respectively – in 1974 and 1981. One
might expect that the votes cast against divorce were less than those cast against
abortion, because abortion – generally speaking – is considered by the Catholic ethic as
being a greater wrong than divorce. Nevertheless, people voting against divorce were
44% whilst there were only 34% against abortion. An interval of seven years could be
large enough in order to explain this difference, as they were years of major cultural
changes, particularly in sexual and reproductive behaviour (Castiglioni, Dalla Zuanna,
1995). Nevertheless, in my opinion another explanation should be added. At the time of
the vote, many Italians may have adopted a familistic viewpoint, considering divorce as
a threat to the family, while abortion was seen as a resource, i.e. the possibility of
solving a private problem inside the family – without fuss, free of charge and with the
help of the Public Health Service: i panni sporchi si lavano in famiglia: “do not wash
your dirty linen in public ”.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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Summing up, two social processes are particularly relevant, to understand
connections among familism, Catholicism and fertility in Italy:
(1) Catholic values are filtered by the familistic way of life. As the Catholic Church
has emphasised some values easily compatible with  familism in Italy,
Catholicism has reinforced familism, and – partially – viceversa. This social
pattern hampers secularisation;
(2) Some non-familistic Catholic values are less and less popular among Italians
and their families. One of these is the non-familistic and unpopular Catholic
value of a large number of children, strongly recommended by the Pope and
Italian bishops, but practised only by a small minority of Italian couples, with a
certain prevalence of those closest to the Catholic Church.
The consequent result is the “paradox” described above: the most traditional and
Catholic Italian couples and counties are characterised by a higher fertility rate
than the majority of secularised ones; but if Italy is compared with other
European countries, a lower level of secularisation is associated with lower
fertility.
6. Final remarks
The forces reducing fertility are not particularly different in Italy compared with the
NCEC. But familism has interacted with them, emphasising the strength of the social
processes, increasing the number of persons without children and depressing the fertility
of the couple. Consequently, the persistence of familistic rules is useful in explaining the
lowest low fertility in Italy during the last 20 years, compared to the NCEC weak-family
area.
Should the social process described here effectively be at play, Italian fertility is
unlikely to perceptibly increase without undermining the strong-family system. But the
secular anthropologic structure of the strong family and kinship is not easily slackened.
In this paper I have tried do show how – in the Italian context – this social-
anthropologic system and the interconnected familistic norms hold, despite far-reaching
economic, social and cultural change. Novelties have been assimilated into Italian
society without loosening (and perhaps even enforcing) its basic familistic structure.
Perhaps, even the diffusion of “new” marital and reproductive behaviour (divorce,
cohabitation, extra-marital fertility) – that could apparently weaken the strong-family
system – actually reinforce it. To give an example, in Italy – as elsewhere – the bonds
between an adult child with his/her parents are often strengthened by a divorce. The
adult child can find in his/her parental family the psychological and material supports to
face the shock of a marital dissolution. Perhaps in the strong-family system – generallyDemographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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speaking – the weaker the ties between partners, the stronger the affective and material
connections between adult children and their parents and kin.
But the persistence of a familistic society could be a pyrrhic victory, because – if
fertility does not substantially increase – the native population risks rapid ageing and
decline. Perhaps, this is the most dangerous menace to the victory of the strong-family
system in Italy.Demographic Research - Volume 4, Article 5
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